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By HERBERT HOVENKAMP*
EVER SINCE THE SHERMAN ACT1 was passed, the interaction be-
tween federal antitrust policy and state lawmaking has been controver-
sial. The framers of the Sherman Act clearly did not intend to displace
all state regulation of the economy.2 To be sure, under the "dual fed-
eralism" that prevailed in the 1890s, Congress could not have done
so. 3 In that era any attempt to regulate purely intrastate economic
affairs would have exceeded congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause, as the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. E. C.
Knight Co.4 a few years later established.5 For their part, the states were
empowered at the time to regulate purely intrastate transactions, but
not those with a significant interstate impact.6 Within this model,
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, University of Iowa College of Law.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
2. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943); 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw (3d ed. forthcoming, 2007) (manuscript 102, 216(a), on
file with author); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAw, 1836-1937, at
241-95 (1991) [hereinafter HOVENEAP, ENTERPRIsE];James May, The Role of the States in the
First Century of the Sherman Act and the Larger Picture of Antitrust, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 93, 100
(1990); James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and
Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 495, 499 (1987); cf
R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 112 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1974) ("The history of the
Sherman Antitrust Act makes it clear that the Congress did not intend that the federal
legislation preempt parallel state efforts to control unfair competitive practices.").
3. See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 2, at 79-92. The classic statements con-
cerning the limitations on state and federal power under the Commerce Clause in the
nineteenth century are Felix Frankfurter, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY
AND WAITE, 11-73 (1937); Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36VA. L. REv. 1,
3 (1950). For a good, brief history, see Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying
the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REv.
1447, 1454 (1995).
4. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
5. Id. at 17 (holding that the Sherman Act does not reach a sugar trust that manufac-
tured in multiple states when the restraint was not claimed to be in the interstate shipment
of sugar).
6. SeeWabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1886) (hold-
ing that while the state could regulate rates of a completely intrastate rail shipment, it
lacked the power to regulate any portion of an interstate shipment, even that part con-
tained entirely within the state); HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 2, at 79-83.
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there were very few perceived overlaps, 7 and Congress really had no
choice but to recognize the power of the states to engage in economic
regulation within their own boundaries.
Nevertheless, even within this regime, conflicts could arise. Al-
ready in 1904 the Supreme Court had to face a "state action" defense
to a government antitrust challenge. The Northern Securities Com-
pany had taken advantage of a provision of the New Jersey Corpora-
tion Act, which permitted the creation of a holding company that
held out-of-state assets.8 The result was a merger of the two most sig-
nificant east-west interstate railroads in the northern part of the
United States. The defendants argued that the Sherman Act was not
intended to preempt state law.9 Because the merger in question was
justified by state corporation laws, it could not violate the antitrust
laws. 10 However, the Sherman Act permitted the government to pur-
sue "combinations" in restraint of trade, making no distinction be-
tween purely private combinations" and those that were formed with
the sanction of a state government. 12 The Supreme Court rejected this
"state action" defense in only a few sentences, concluding that while
the NewJersey statute permitted holding companies, there was no evi-
dence that it was intended to permit anticompetitive combinations.13
The Court also added that "[i] t cannot be said that any state may give
a corporation... authority to restrain interstate ... commerce against
the will of ... Congress."1 4
The antitrust "state action"1 5 doctrine in its modern form was
made necessary by the collapse of dual federalism in the 1940s, partic-
7. HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 2, at 79-92.
8. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 326-27 (1904).
9. Id. at 333-34.
10. Id. at 371.
11. E.g., United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 341 (1897) (con-
demning privately created joint venture among railroads under Sherman Act); United
States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 577 (1898). Both Trans-Missouri and Joint-Traffic
involved "joint running arrangements," which were joint ventures that did not require the
formation of a new corporation or the sanction of state corporate law. Trans-Mo., 166 U.S.
at 365.
12. N. Sec., 193 U.S. at 345-46.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 346.
15. The antitrust "state action" doctrine is different from and much narrower than
the Fourteenth Amendment state action doctrine, and the two are rarely confused. The
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine automatically extends to all states and government sub-
divisions, as well as their officials acting under color of state law and occasionally even
private entities performing public functions. In contrast, the antitrust state action immu-
nity applies only where the requirements of clear articulation and active supervision of
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ularly with the Supreme Court's decision in Wickard v. Filburn,16 which
expanded federal economic power to reach predominately intrastate
transactions provided that they "affected" United States commerce.
17
At that point, significant conflict between federal antitrust and state
regulation became possible. The Supreme Court responded a year
later with Parker v. Brown,18 which created the antitrust state action
doctrine, immunizing a state-sanctioned agreement that reduced the
output of California raisins.1 9
While the state action doctrine was entirely a creation of the Su-
preme Court, the views of Congress during this period were largely
sympathetic. In United States v. South Eastern Underwriters,20 decided two
years after Wickard and a year after Parker, the Supreme Court held
that insurance transactions were within interstate commerce and thus
within the reach of the Sherman Act.21 Congress then responded in
1945 with the McCarran-Ferguson Act,22 which immunized the "busi-
ness of insurance" from most federal legislation, including the anti-
trust laws.23 McCarran-Ferguson is significant in part because in 1945,
when that statute was passed, Congress clearly did have the power to
reach intrastate transactions with interstate effects, thus overriding in-
consistent state mandates. 24 However, Congress largely chose not to
do so with respect to insurance, preferring at that time to leave most
of its regulation to the states.25
Thus, in the space of four years in the early 1940s, the Supreme
Court and Congress established what has become the modern frame-
work for understanding the relationship between federal antitrust pol-
icy and regulation by the states. The question today is whether this
private conduct have been met. All further references to "state action" in this Article are to
the antitrust doctrine.
16. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
17. Id. at 121, 124.
18. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
19. Id. at 368.
20. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
21. Id. at 540-42. The decision substantially overruled the Court's decision in Paul v.
Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868), that insurance had an essentially intrastate character. In
Paul, the Court concluded that a Virginia statute requiring out of state insurance compa-
nies to obtain a license before doing business in Virginia did not offend either the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause or the Commerce Clause. 75 U.S. at 177-83.
22. Ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1012 (2000)); Ch.
326, 61 Stat. 448 (1947) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000)).
23. Ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33; Ch. 326, 61 Stat. 448.
24. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942).
25. BaddiaJ. Rashid, Note, The Trend of Insurance Regulation, 35 GEO. L.J. 102, 102-03
(1946).
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framework still works, and if it does not, whether it needs to be mod-
ernized or jettisoned completely. This Article offers a few basic consid-
erations and some suggestions for reform.
I. Considerations Used in Evaluating the Modem
Relationship Between Federal Antitrust Policy and
States Regulation
A. Changing Attitudes Toward Regulation and the Role of
Antitrust
The relationship between federal antitrust policy and state eco-
nomic regulation is driven in part by attitudes toward regulation. Al-
though the point is easily overstated, today we are less optimistic about
regulation than we were a half century ago. The state action exemp-
tion was formulated at a time when federal power was expanding rap-
idly and confidence in regulation was generally high.26 By contrast, in
the last quarter century we have become much less confident in regu-
lation at every government level. The rise of public choice theory and
the deregulation movement reflect different aspects of these
changes. 27Just as these changes have occasioned less deference to fed-
eral regulation, they can do the same thing for state or local govern-
ment regulation.
One is tempted to say that during this same period we have ac-
quired more confidence about the role of antitrust enforcement, as
an alternative to affirmative regulation, in producing efficient eco-
nomic outcomes. But that point is open to dispute, and some critics
take just as dim a view of antitrust enforcement as they do of regula-
tion.28 To be sure, deregulation has increased the domain of antitrust
by removing regulatory immunities that once existed.29 As a result,
antitrust is now applied in markets such as air passenger travel or tele-
communications where there was once thought to be a substantial reg-
ulatory immunity. To say that antitrust's domain has expanded,
26. For historical perspective, see IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, 241.
27. See 1A id. 241b2 (public choice); 1A id. 241b3 (changes in economic theory
arguing for deregulation). See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. F~icKEv, LAW AND
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991). For specific application to regulation,
see Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335
(1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3
(1971).
28. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. Rv. 1, 15 (1984);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4, 16
(1984).
29. See IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, 241.
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however, is not necessarily to say that our confidence level in antitrust
enforcement has increased as confidence in regulation has declined.
One might as easily say that our confidence level in all types of govern-
ment intervention in the market has declined, and that the decline
cuts across both regulatory and antitrust policy.
Actually, the antitrust story is more nuanced than this. While we
have become far more skeptical about our once aggressive policies
against exclusionary practices, such as vertical restraints and mergers,
antitrust policy is as fierce as ever about naked cartels. Problemati-
cally, however, the types of restraints for which state law regulatory
immunity is sought run the full gamut. Some state regulation con-
dones fairly blatant collusion.30 However, antitrust challenges to state
action are frequently brought under the weakest possible antitrust
theories.31 For example, it is hard to see any antitrust violation in a
city's order to the dominant cable company to restrain its expansion
for a time so that the city might assess whether entry by rivals is appro-
priate;3 2 or a municipality's refusal to supply utilities to outlying areas
that had not been annexed;33 or its decision to create its own cable
television system rather than purchasing CATV services from a private
firm.3 4 Many other state action cases involve challenges to such things
as exclusive contracts, ordinarily treated as either exclusive dealing or
tying. The great majority of such arrangements are lawful even when
the firm imposing the arrangement is a monopolist, and in many of
these cases the hospital or similar publicly operated institution claim-
30. E.g., FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (noting weak state supervi-
sion of title insurance rate bureaus, leading effectively to unsupervised collusion); New
Eng. Motor Rate Bureau, Inc. v. FTC, 908 F.2d 1064, 1071 (1st Cir. 1990) (similar facts); In
re New Eng. Motor Rate Bureau, Inc., 112 F.T.C. 200 (1989) (vacated on other grounds);
Mass. Bd. of Registration of Optometry, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,555 (1988); see IA
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, 226c.
31. See 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, 228b.
32. Cmty. Commc'n Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 44-45 (1982). The mu-
nicipal ordinance challenged as an antitrust violation delayed the territorial expansion of
the plaintiff, the dominant incumbent cable firm, while the city council decided whether
to open the field to additional competitors. In all events, a dominant firm alleging that a
restraint limited its power to expand its monopoly so that new rivals could be given an
opportunity to come in is not a victim of antitrust injury. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, 337
(2d ed. 2000).
33. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 37 (1985). Placed in a private
context, the claim in Hallie was tantamount to claiming that General Motors violated the
antitrust laws by providing snow removal services only to its own properties, but not to
adjoining properties that it did not own.
34. Paragould Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Paragould, 930 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 963 (1992).
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ing the exemption was only one of many competitors.35 Still others are
challenges to such practices as peer review, which are rarely anticom-
petitive unless abused.3 6 Others involve standard setting or rule mak-
ing that cannot be an antitrust violation because no benefit accrues to
the organization making the rules.37
Some see the rise of public choice theory as a compelling reason
for either narrowing the reach of the state action immunity or for
removing the immunity for proven instances of regulatory capture. 38
However, it is not clear to me that antitrust tribunals need to respond
in any programmatic way to changes in regulatory attitude. Repairing
imperfections in political processes is not antitrust's purpose. Neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has ever authorized the use of anti-
trust as a wide ranging mandate to fix imperfections in government
process. Rather, the antitrust laws are explicitly designed to control
private restraints. Further, most serious abuses of government process
are better remedied by laws that are more directly tailored for that
purpose, such as those condemning bribery, financial abuses, or other
forms of corruption. These laws do not carry antitrust's additional,
significant proof requirements of market power and economic harm,
and at least some of them are enforceable by criminal sanctions.
Public choice is relevant in another sense, however. Public choice
theory serves as a warning that many so-called "public" restraints are
really private restraints by another name. That message is twofold: if a
state or local government really authorizes and effectively supervises a
private restraint, so be it. Federal antitrust cannot intervene simply
because federal tribunals believe that the regulation in question is ill-
advised, inefficient, or a manifestation of interest group capture. How-
35. See, e.g.,Jackson, Tenn. Hosp. Co. v. W. Tenn. Healthcare, Inc., 414 F.3d 608, 611
(6th Cir. 2005); Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 824 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 924 (1990).
36. See, e.g., Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 980 F.2d 1381, 1388 (11th Cir. 1993).
37. Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants of La., 139 F.3d 1033, 1043 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 982 (1998) (state accountancy board promulgates rule prohibit-
ing CPAs, its own members, from selling securities).
38. E.g., John T. Delacourt & Todd Zywicki, The FTC and State Action: Evolving Views on
the Proper Role of Government; 72 A1NTRUST L.J. 1075 (2005). Other good discussions include
Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine:
Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REv.
1203 (1997); Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferen-
tial Economic Federalism, 75 CAL. L. Rv. 227 (1987); William H. Page, Interest Groups, Anti-
trust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DuKE
L.J. 618 (1987); William H. Page &John E. Lopatka, State Regulation in the Shadow of Anti-
trust: FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 189 (1993);John Shephard
Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HAv. L. REv. 713 (1986).
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ever, antitrust need not countenance restraints in which the effective
decision makers are the market participants themselves.39
B. Concerns for Federalism
Pulling in the opposite direction, the trimming of the federal reg-
ulatory agenda has been accompanied by a return to federalism-i.e.,
to take preemptive regulatory power away from the federal govern-
ment and restore it to the states. This would seem to suggest more
deference by federal antitrust tribunals to state regulation, and thus
an expanded role for state action immunity.
Concerns for federalism were not particularly prominent in the
Supreme Court's Parker decision. Rather, the Court seemed to regard
the regulation in question as enacted in the public interest.40 In sharp
contrast, the first edition of the Areeda & Turner ANTITRUST LAW trea-
tise, published in 1978, seated the state action doctrine squarely
within the authors' concerns for federalism. Areeda and Turner ar-
gued that the "proper" grounds for state action immunity were two-
fold. First, there should not be Parker immunity "without adequate
public supervision" of private conduct.4 1 Second, there must be "au-
thorized state action clearly intended to displace antitrust law."42 The
Supreme Court picked up these criteria almost verbatim in its Midcal
decision three years later,43 and since then, clear authorization and
active supervision have come to define the two elements for the state
39. See discussion infra notes 81-86.
40. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943). On this point, see Delacourt &
Zywicki, supra note 38.
41. 1 PHILUP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 213 (1978). The tide
of this Paragraph was "Proper Immunity Limits I: No Parker Immunity Without Adequate
Public Supervision," and Areeda and Turner state:
[A] state may be free to determine for itself how much competition is desirable,
provided that it substitutes adequate public control wherever it has substantially
weakened competition .... [T]he adequate supervision criterion ensures that
state-federal conflict will be avoided in those area in which the state has demon-
strated its commitment to a program through its exercise of regulatory oversight.
At the same time, it guarantees that when the Sherman Act is set aside, private
firms are not left to their own devices. Rather, immunity will be granted only
when the state has substituted its own supervision for the economic constraints of
the competitive market.
1 Id. at 72-73 (footnotes omitted).
42. See 1 id. 214, which was tided "Proper Immunity Limits II: No Parker Immunity
Without Authorized State Action Clearly Intended to Displace Antitrust Law."
43. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106
(1980).
Spring 2006] AMC SYMPOSIUM
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
action doctrine, at least when the conduct in question is that of pri-
vate parties.44
Thus, it seems clear that, while the initial Parker v. Brown state
action doctrine rested on ideas about regulatory supremacy rather
than federalism, today that is no longer the case. Since Midcal, neither
the Supreme Court nor the lower courts have indulged any presump-
tion that state regulation is in the "public interest," or that it produces
better outcomes than antitrust laws. Rather, the foundation of the
doctrine lies in discernment of the state's own commitment to regulate.
If that commitment is appropriately stated, then the federal tribunal
should not intervene no matter what it may think of the merits of the
regulation at issue.
C. Growth of Multistate Markets: Spillovers
The enlargement of markets and internationalization of the
economy that provided the backdrop for the expansion of federal reg-
ulatory power in the 1930s and 1940s has not subsided. To the con-
trary, the rise of electronic markets has only served to accelerate the
pace at which markets have become at least national and often inter-
national or even global.45 As a general proposition, regulation of large
markets by small governments is inefficient because it results in exces-
sive self dealing and protectionism. 46
II. Applications: McCarran-Ferguson and "State Action"
A. McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Immunity: The Case for Repeal
When the McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed in 1945, state regu-
lation of insurance was significant, extending to such things as rates,
coverage, and financial integrity.4 7 The South Eastern Underwriters
44. Id. See 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, 221f (3d ed.). Under the post-
Midcal case law the conduct of private parties must be both authorized and supervised. The
conduct of the "state itself" is inherently authorized and need not be supervised. Id. The
conduct of officials representing state subdivisions, such as municipalities or most agen-
cies, must be authorized but need not be supervised. For elaboration, see generally 1 id.
221-27.
45. Herbert Hovenkamp & John A. Mackerron III, Municipal Regulation and Federal
Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. Rav. 719, 720 (1985).
46. Id.
47. See ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 21, at 74-75 (2d ed. 1996)
(noting that, by 1919, thirty-six states had "departments" or commissions charged with reg-
ulating insurance, and that by 1930 these agencies had been given authority to collect
information from insurers and to review at least some business decisions and approve some
forms); see a/SOJOHN G. DAY, DEPT. OF TRANsP., ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES 18 (1970) (stating that by 1944 there was substantial state agency involve-
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case 48 threatened to undermine state regulation by permitting federal
antitrust to be inserted into a market that had traditionally been re-
served for the states. The first paragraph ofJustice Black's opinion for
the Court defined the issue:
For seventy-five years this Court has held, whenever the question
has been presented, that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution
does not deprive the individual states of power to regulate and tax
specific activities of foreign insurance companies which sell poli-
cies within their territories. Each state has been held to have this
power even though negotiation and execution of the companies'
policy contracts involved communications of information and
movements of persons, moneys, and papers across state lines. Not
one of all these cases, however, has involved an Act of Congress
which required the Court to decide the issue of whether the Com-
merce Clause grants to Congress the power to regulate insurance
transactions stretching across state lines. Today for the first time in
the history of the Court that issue is squarely presented and must
be decided. 49
The South Eastern Underwriters case itself involved allegations of
price-fixing among a half dozen insurers serving several states, as well
as an agreement to boycott rivals and force purchasers to deal only
with the defendants. 50 The McCarran-Ferguson Act would have immu-
nized the first of these claims, provided that insurance was adequately
regulated, but its "boycott" exception would probably have denied im-
munity to the second.5 1
Notwithstanding its then recent decision in Parker, the South East-
ern Underwriters opinion took a much less accommodating attitude to-
ward state regulation:
[I] t is argued at great length that virtually all the states regulate the
insurance business on the theory that competition in the field of
insurance is detrimental both to the insurers and the insured, and
that if the Sherman Act be held applicable to insurance much of
this state regulation will be destroyed. The first part of this argu-
ment in the process of insurance rate regulation). On specific instances of state regulation,
see, for example, Am. Druggists' Fire Ins. Co. of Cincinnati, Ohio v. State Ins. Bd., 84 P.2d
614, 616 (Okla. 1938); see also Hassler v. Engberg, 48 N.W.2d 343, 347-48 (Minn. 1951);
English Freight Co. v. Knox, 180 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Caminetti v. Manierre,
142 P.2d 741 (Cal. 1943); United Employers Cas. Co. v. Pearlman Auto Parts & Supply Co.,
173 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
48. United States v. S. E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
49. Id. at 534.
50. Id. at 535.
51. The Act contains an exception for boycotts. See 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (2000)
("Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the... Sherman Act inapplicable to any
agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.");
I AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, 220 (3d ed.).
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ment is buttressed by opinions expressed by various persons that
unrestricted competition in insurance results in financial chaos
and public injury. Whether competition is a good thing for the
insurance business is not for us to consider. Having power to enact
the Sherman Act, Congress did so; if exceptions are to be written into
the Act, they must come from the Congress, not this Court.
The argument that the Sherman Act necessarily invalidates many
state laws regulating insurance we regard as exaggerated. Few states
go so far as to permit private insurance companies, without state
supervision, to agree upon and fix uniform insurance rates.... No
states authorize combinations of insurance companies to coerce,
intimidate, and boycott competitors and consumers in the manner
here alleged, and it cannot be that any companies have acquired a
vested right to engage in such .... 52
Congress then responded with the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
which was intended to restore the state regulatory prerogative. The
Act exempted the insurance industry from federal laws of general ap-
plication and included an antitrust exemption that applied if the in-
surance business was regulated by state law.53
In 1945, when the McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed, Congress
apparently did not foresee subsequent developments in the antitrust
state action doctrine that would have served to immunize many insur-
ance restraints, provided that they were adequately regulated. Indeed,
the state action doctrine would have provided a much more balanced
approach to the problem of ineffectual state insurance regulation.
One of the ironies of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is that it tends
to immunize practices that pose a significant threat to competition,
such as competitor agreements fixing rates or reducing policy cover-
age, 5 4 but not various vertical practices that are almost certainly not
antitrust violations at all. By its terms, the statute applies only to the
"business of insurance," which involves such things as the making of
52. S. E. Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 561-62 (emphasis added) (citing Parker as an exam-
ple of a situation where the state did authorize such combinations).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). The Act provides:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance: Provided, That ... [the antitrust laws and FTC Act]
shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is
not regulated by State Law.
Id.
54. See, e.g., Gilchrist v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 390 F.3d 1327 (1 lth Cir. 2004)
(immunizing agreement among insurers to require use of inferior replacement crash parts
in auto repair).
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rates or the determination of policy coverage. 55 On the other hand,
purely vertical arrangements under which insurers provide prescrip-
tion drugs or other non-insurance services or engage in peer review of
providers are frequently held to fall outside the "business of insur-
ance," and thus are non-immune.56 The same is true of insurer efforts
at cost control via limitations of such things as auto repair prices.57 In
sum, the statute tends to immunize serious horizontal restraints, while
finding no immunity for vertical restraints that are far less likely to be
anticompetitive.
While the statute seems to allow for broader application of the
antitrust laws to insurance than other federal provisions, 58 the courts
have not read it that way. Further, the phrase "regulated by state law"
in the McCarran-Ferguson Act has come to mean something quite dif-
ferent than the "authorization" and "active supervision" required by
the state action doctrine. To illustrate, suppose that the state has in-
surance regulation in place, but the general thrust of this regulation is
to oppose horizontal agreements fixing insurance premiums. In such
a case, one might say that a Sherman Act complaint alleging unlawful
price fixing would be in furtherance of, rather than inconsistent with,
the state's regulatory policy. Nevertheless, the courts generally agree
that the Sherman Act complaint is preempted. The mere presence of
state regulation is sufficient to oust the federal antitrust claim.
In addition, the courts have generally been satisfied with virtually
any degree of regulation, and even the most superficial indicators of
supervision.59 They have suggested that the mere existence of an
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1011.
56. Id.
57. See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 134 (1982) (holding that
peer review is not immune); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205,
232-33 (1979) (holding that there is no immunity for health insurer's agreement with
pharmacies setting maximum rates for prescriptions for its insureds); see also Brillhart v.
Mut. Med. Ins., Inc., 768 F.2d 196, 200 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that physician's agree-
ment to provide medical services to subscribers at price to be determined by insurance
company is not immune); St. Bernard Hosp. v. Hosp. Serv. Ass'n, 618 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.
1980) (holding that contract limiting reimbursement of plaintiff for-profit hospital to aver-
age charges of non-profit hospitals is not immune); Liberty Glass Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
607 F.2d 135, 136 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that insurer's cost-control arrangements involv-
ing other repairers is not immune).
58. The debates indicate that Congress intended to leave more room for antitrust en-
forcement against the insurance industry than for the application of other laws not explic-
itly directed at the insurance industry. See, e.g., 91 CONG. Rac. 1444 (1945) (remarks of Sen.
Pepper); id. at 1484 (remarks of Sen. Murdock).
59. See Crawford v. Am. Title Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that
an Alabama statute prohibiting "all unfair methods of competition" was sufficient regula-
tion to create McCarran immunity); Oh. AFL-CIO v. Ins. Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1184
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agency or official with insurance oversight is adequate regulation. 60
The Ninth Circuit believes that the mere fact that the state has ap-
pointed an insurance commissioner and required him to approve all
policies is sufficient. 61 In another case, it inferred sufficient regulation
from the fact that a state statute banned unfair or deceptive practices
in the health insurance industry.62 The courts have not required au-
thorization of the specific conduct that is the subject of the antitrust
challenge. 63 The Eighth Circuit has held that a statute giving the state
power to "investigate" rates and methods of competition was sufficient
regulation to support the immunity, even if there was no evidence
that actual investigating was occurring. 6
4
In sum, the McCarran-Ferguson immunity requires no "active su-
pervision" of private conduct at all, and only the most general state-
ment of authorization, certainly nothing like the authorization
requirement in the state action doctrine.
While principles of federalism may require that federal antitrust
authority yield on matters where a state has made clear its wish to
regulate, no principle mandates such yielding to little more than na-
(6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972) ("[T]here is nothing in the language of
the McCarran Act or in its legislative history to support the thesis that the Act does not
apply when the state's scheme of regulation has not been effectively enforced."); see also
Gilchrist, 390 F.3d at 1334 (finding immunity for alleged insurer agreement reducing qual-
ity of repair parts; noting that Florida, the most relevant state, regulated the general indus-
try intensely, and that many states also regulate the use of non-OEM repair parts).
60. For example, FTC v. National Casualty, 357 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1958), refused to
inquire into how state regulatory provisions were applied, with the possible exception
where the regulation was a "mere pretense." Accord Ocean State Physicians Health Plan,
Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d 1101, 1108-09 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1027 (1990); In re Workers' Comp. Ins. Antitrust Litig., 867 F.2d 1552, 1557-58
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989); Health Care Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Med.
Soc'y, 851 F.2d 1020, 1029 (8th Cir. 1988).
61. Freier v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 679 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Proctor v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 317 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 839
(1982) (declining to disturb district court finding that virtually any regulation specifically
mentioning insurance industry will suffice).
62. Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass'n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1287
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983).
63. See, e.g., Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 503 F.2d
725, 728 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975) (finding that a simple statute
regulating unfair practices in insurance industry sufficient, regardless of "whether
the ... laws proscribe or permit the alleged acts of economic coercion in the issuance of
life insurance policies" challenged in this case).
64. Workers Comp. Ins., 867 F.2d at 1558. A concurring judge objected: "Given Minne-
sota's intentional deregulation of workers' compensation rates, I would find that Minne-
sota does not 'regulate' these rates for purposes of... McCarran-Ferguson. While the state
did maintain a general regulatory presence in the field, there was no specific regulation
targeted at the alleged practices at issue . . . ." Id. at 1569 (Beam, J. concurring).
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ked private power. One can protest, of course, that today many states
regulate their insurance markets vigorously and are constantly on the
lookout for abuses. But in those situations repeal would not be harm-
ful, for the state action immunity would protect the results.
Furthermore, the idea expressed by the Supreme Court in Paul v.
Virginia65 that insurance is largely a matter of state contract law is not
close to the reality we live in today.66 Insurance is very largely sold in
multistate or even national markets. While this fact may not make
state regulation unimportant, it exacerbates the possibility of socially
harmful spillovers.
In sum, repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act need not have any
harmful consequences for federalism or the competitive health of the
insurance industry. Bona fide regulatory oversight will continue to
qualify the industry for the state action exemption, provided that the
authorization and supervision requirements are met.
B. Reform of the Antitrust "State Action" Doctrine
The current Parker state action immunity doctrine could be im-
proved in several ways. First, courts can apply the articulation require-
ment more narrowly. Second, the FTC's suggestion of requiring state
regulatory agencies to provide reasoned elaborations in order to meet
65. 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868); see discussion supra note 21.
66. Indeed, the interstate character of the insurance industry was already clear in the
1940s, when South Eastern Undenriters was decided. In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Black described it this way:
This business is not separated into 48 distinct territorial compartments which
function in isolation from each other. Interrelationship, interdependence, and
integration of activities in all the states in which they operate are practical aspects
of the insurance companies' methods of doing business. A large share of the in-
surance business is concentrated in a comparatively few companies located, for
the most part, in the financial centers of the East. Premiums collected from poli-
cyholders in every part of the United States flow into these companies for invest-
ment. As policies become payable, checks and drafts flow back to the many states
where the policyholders reside. The result is a continuous and indivisible stream
of intercourse among the states composed of collections of premiums, payments
of policy obligations, and the countless documents and communications which
are essential to the negotiation and execution of policy contracts. Individual poli-
cyholders living in many different states who own policies in a single company
have their separate interests blended in one assembled fund of assets upon which
all are equally dependent for payment of their policies. The decisions which that
company makes at its home office-the risks it insures, the premiums it charges,
the investments it makes, the losses it pays-concern not just the people of the
state where the home office happens to be located. They concern people living
far beyond the boundaries of that state.
United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 541-42 (1944) (footnote omitted).
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the active supervision requirement has merit. Third, courts must de-
velop a coherent doctrine with which to address spillovers. Fourth,
administrative problems in the disposition of antitrust cases must be
remedied. Finally, antitrust tribunals must be more sensitive to sub-
stantive issues of antitrust policy.
1. Articulation Requirement Reforms
First, too many courts interpret the authorization requirement far
too broadly. In Midcal, the Supreme Court required clear articulation
and affirmative expression of a state's intent to authorize the chal-
lenged restraint.67 Writing a few years prior to Midca4 Areeda and
Turner expressed this requirement as a "clear statement'. rule that
presumed lack of immunity unless the relevant statute stated its intent
clearly. 68
After a few years of restrictive interpretations of this requirement,
the Supreme Court loosened it up, finding in Town of Hallie v. City of
Eau ClaireP9 that it was sufficient if the restraint was a "foreseeable re-
sult" of the regulatory authorization.7 0 Since Hallie, the trend in the
lower courts has been to interpret state statutes generously so as to
find authorization. 71 Indeed, the courts have gone so far as to infer
clear articulation from such things as the granting of ordinary corpo-
rate powers-inferring, for example, that a general grant of the cor-
67. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
68. See 1 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 41, 221:
Both the meaning of state approval and the extent of state authorization must be
subject to a clear statement requirement. Adoption of a policy requiring a state to
make a clear statement of its intention to supplant competition reconciles the
interests of the states in adopting noncompetitive policies with the strong na-
tional policy favoring competition, and is consistent with the canon of federal
statutory construction that exemptions to the antitrust laws are not to be lightly
inferred. Where there is no other indication of the proper scope of an officer's
authority or of the meaning of state approval, a clear statement requirement is
the best approach, because it ensures that the strong federal policy embodied in
the antitrust laws will not be set aside where not intended by the state, and yet
also guarantees that the state will not be prevented by the antitrust laws alone
from supplanting those laws as long as it makes its purpose clear.
The clear statement requirement does not prevent the state from indicating its
interest, as it can always make its intent clear. It merely ensures that the inertia in
the system is used in the service of the federal interest in free competition.
1 Id. (footnotes omitted).
69. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
70. Id. at 42; accord City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365; 373
(1991).
71. See 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, 224-25 (3d ed.).
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porate power to make contracts authorized a public hospital's
anticompetitive exclusionary contracts.
7 2
Other decisions have properly been much more restrictive. One
court very wisely rejected the argument that courts should infer:
a policy to displace competition from naked grants of authority.
These are the enabling statutes by which myriad instruments of lo-
cal government across the country gain basic corporate powers. To
infer a policy to displace competition from, for example, authority
to enter into joint ventures or other business forms would stand
federalism on its head. A state would henceforth be required to
disclaim affirmatively antitrust immunity, at the peril of creating an
instrument of local government with power the state did not in-
tend to grant. The immediate practical effect would be the exten-
sion of the Parker principle downward, contrary to the teaching
that local instruments of government are subject to the Sherman
Act.73
Although Hallie permitted an inference of authorization to be
drawn from foreseeability, the inference that the Supreme Court drew
in that case was not a particularly long stretch. The City of Eau Claire
was accused of refusing to provide sewage treatment services to unin-
corporated areas around it unless these areas first agreed to be incor-
porated.7 4 The authorizing provision that the City relied on expressly
permitted the City to refuse to provide services to unincorporated ar-
72. See Martin v. Mem'l Hosp. at Gulfport, 86 F.3d 1391 (5th Cir. 1996) (municipal
hospital's exclusive contract with physician to supervise kidney disease center was foresee-
able consequence of state statute authorizing such hospitals to contract for the provision of
services, including entering management contracts, but not explicitly stating that such con-
tracts could be exclusive);Jackson, Tenn. Hosp. Co., v. W. Tenn. Healthcare, Inc., 414 F.3d
608 (6th Cir. 2005) (authority to enter into contracts with physicians implied authority to
enter into anticompetitive agreements); see also Recombinant DNA Tech. & Patent Con-
tract Litig., 874 F. Supp. 904, 911 n.73 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (holding that a statute authorizing
a university to "acquire by grant, purchase, gift, devise, lease, or by the exercise of the right
of eminent domain, and ... hold use, sell, lease, or dispose of any real or personal prop-
erty necessary for the full exercise or convenient or useful for the carrying on of any of its
powers .... " authorized it to agree with a private firm to obtain an exclusive patent license
by fraud). No doubt the court was impelled by serious doubts of any antitrust violation; but
if there were one, a statute giving a university a general power to acquire, manage, and
dispose of property hardly includes anticompetitive agreements in violation of federal anti-
trust law as a foreseeable consequence.
73. Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond v. Hosp. Serv. Dist., 171 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 964 (1999). The court refused to find authorization from legislation
that gave a hospital the power to contract and to enter into joint ventures with other health
providers. As it noted, "Not all joint ventures are anticompetitive. Thus, it is not the fore-
seeable result of allowing a hospital service district to form joint ventures that it will engage
in anticompetitive conduct." Id. at 235; accord Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley
Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992).
74. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 36-37 (1985).
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eas, 75 but it did not expressly authorize anticompetitive actions or an-
titrust violations. Likewise, in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising, Inc.,76 the Supreme Court found it sufficiently foreseeable
that a grant of power to regulate the land use process contemplated
the power to control the type and placement of advertising bill-
boards.77 In sharp contrast, all corporations are granted the power to
enter into contracts, but this hardly expresses a "clear articulation" of
the state's desire that they be permitted to enter into anticompetitive
agreements. 78
As a general rule, ambiguities in state authorizing provisions
should be construed against authorization. This conclusion flows from
the fact that the antitrust laws declare a clear national policy of
preventing anticompetitive restraints, and that most states declare a
similar policy via their own antitrust laws or regulatory provisions. As a
result, state and local government regulatory policy is painted on a
canvas in which federal and state policies favoring competition form a
clear background. While the Parker doctrine rests on the premise that
a state is free to deviate from this policy in specific situations if it
chooses, such deviations should not be found absent a clear expres-
sion by the state that it desires to do so. 7 9
75. See Wis. STAT. § 66.069(2)(c) (1981-1982), (renumbered in part and repealed in
part by 1999 Act 150, current version at § 66.0813(3) (a) (2003)) (A city providing a public
utility "may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unincorporated areas. Such ordi-
nance shall delineate the area within which service will be provided and the municipal
utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond the area so delineated.").
Further, another Wisconsin statute provided that the state's Department of Natural
Resources may require a city to interconnect with surrounding areas; however, it also pro-
vided that such an order would be void if the outlying territory refused to become annexed
to the city. See Wis. STAT. § 144.07(1) (1981-1982) (renumbered by 1995 Act 227, current
version at § 283.43 (2005)); Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 41.
76. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
77. Id. at 370-72.
78. See the FTC's state action Task Force Report, which would inquire "whether the
state has deliberately adopted a policy to displace competition in the manner at issue."
FED. TRADE COMM'N, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE
51 (2003) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]; see also The State Action Doctrine: Hearing Before
the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n (2005) (statement of Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Dir., Of-
fice of Policy Planning, Fed. Trade Comm'n), available at http://www.amc.gov/commis-
sionhearings/pdf/OhlhausenStatement.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
79. When a state wishes to, its authorization can be very clear. Consider this Georgia
statute:
It is declared by the General Assembly of Georgia that in the exercise of powers
specifically granted to them by law, local governing authorities of cities and coun-
ties are acting pursuant to state policy .... This chapter is intended to articulate
clearly and express affirmatively the policy of the State of Georgia that in the
exercise of such powers, such local governing authorities shall be immune from
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When a state grants power to an inferior entity, it* presumably
grants the power to do the thing contemplated, but not to do so an-
ticompetitively. For example, an authorization to a corporation to
enter into contracts is not to be construed as an authorization to enter
into price fixing or other anticompetitive agreements unless the au-
thorizing provision states so clearly.
2. Active Supervision Requirement Reforms
The problem with the "active supervision" requirement has not
been quite as severe since the Supreme Court's decision in Ticor Ti-
tle,80 establishing that active supervision requires actual government
review of private conduct."' Nevertheless, there are still problem ar-
eas. For example, there is much to be said for the FTC's suggestion
that if a state regulatory agency is going to approve a particular in-
stance of rate bureaus or other forms of regulatory price fixing, it
should issue a written opinion on the merits, supported by a set of fact
findings that explain its decision. 82 Such reasoned elaborations serve
to provide transparency to the process and help ensure that agency
decisions do not reflect simple private interest capture.8 3 This prong
of the Midcal test requires that the state both "have and exercise ulti-
mate authority"84 so that it can be said that the resulting decision is a
product of "deliberate state intervention, not simply by agreement
among private parties."8 5
3. The Problem of Spillovers
Whenever we consider the values of federalism and the respective
roles of state and federal regulation, some attention must be given to
antitrust liability to the same degree and extent as enjoyed by the State of
Georgia.
GA. CODE ANN. § 36-65-1, -2 (2000); seeMcCallum v. City of Athens, 976 F.2d 649, 655 (l1th
Cir. 1992) (stating that "by enacting [this provision] Georgia unequivocally revealed that it
contemplated that its municipalities might engage in anticompetitive conduct").
80. FTC v. Ticor Tide Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
81. But see William J. Martin, Comment, State Action Antitrust Immunity for Municipally
Supervised Parties, 72 U. CI. L. R~v. 1079 (2005) (arguing that the courts analyze claims of
state supervision rigorously, while applying a much more lenient standard to local govern-
ment supervision).
82. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 78, at 55.
83. See TimothyJ. Muris, Clarifying the State Action and Noerr Exemptions, 27 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'y 443, 448 (2004).
84. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988) (quoting So. Motor Carriers Rate Con-
ference, Inc. v. United States, 417 U.S. 48, 51 (1985)); see generally 1A AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, 226c (3d ed.).
85. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 634-35.
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the problem of spillovers, or extraterritorial effects. It is one thing to
approve an anticompetitive state regulatory scheme when the burden
falls substantially on that state's own residents. But federalism does
not require federal authority to permit states to export anticompeti-
tive regulatory schemes. Under the current formulation of the state
action exemption, extraterritorial impact of state regulatory schemes
is not even regarded as relevant. To be sure, antitrust is not the only
vehicle for addressing these problems. Anticompetitive state regula-
tory schemes that have too severe an impact on interstate commerce
can and have been struck down under the Commerce Clause.8 6
The Federal Trade Commission's Report of its State Action Task
Force ("Task Force Report") is quite concerned about extraterritorial
spillovers of anticompetitive state regulation.87 As that document ob-
serves, the spillover problem has long been recognized in the aca-
demic literature. 88 However, the Task Force Report then noted only
Parker itself as a decision that involved significant spillovers.89
Under the state action doctrine in its current form, spillovers are
simply irrelevant to the question of antitrust illegality. If the state has
sufficiently articulated its wish to displace the antitrust laws and pri-
86. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (ban on out-of-state wine ship-
ments violates Commerce Clause); So. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999)
(discriminatory franchise tax levied on out-of-state corporations violated commerce
clause); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) (use tax exemption that favored
in-state sellers of natural gas did not violate either commerce clause or equal protection
clause); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996) (striking down North Carolina tax
on residents' ownership of out of state corporate shares); Associated Indus. of Mo. v.
Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (1994) (striking down tax on value of goods purchased outside the
state but consumed, used, or stored inside the state); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340
U.S. 349 (1951) (statute prohibited sale of milk as pasteurized unless processed within five
miles of Madison).
87. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 78, at 40-44, 56-57.
88. Id. at 40-44 (citing Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the
Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regula-
tory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1203 (1997)); Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State
Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 CAL. L. REV. 227 (1987); David
McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and
the First Amendment, 17 Hiv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 293 (1994); Einer Elhauge, The Scope of
Antitrust Process, 104 HARv. L. REv. 667 (1991);John E. Lopatka, State Action and Municipal
Antitrust Immunity: An Economic Approach, 53 FoRDHAm L. REv. 23 (1984); Frank H. Easter-
brook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1983); Hovenkamp &
Mackerron, supra note 45, at 719; William E. Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy Reform in
Transition Economies for U.S. Antitrust Policy, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 361 (2000).
89. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 78, at 40. The TASK FORCE REPORT also noted
the example given in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. that "a municipality
conceivably might charge discriminatorily higher rates to such captive customers outside
its jurisdiction without a costjustified basis." 435 U.S. 389, 404 (1978). But the Report did
not suggest that significant spillovers were at issue in Lafayette.
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vate conduct is adequately supervised, then it does not matter how
much the regulatory program in question injures those outside the
jurisdiction of the state or local government imposing the regulation.
As a consequence, judicial records are not developed so as to high-
light spillover effects. A coherent doctrine of spillovers and its inclu-
sion as a state action immunity requirement will therefore require
some new directions in case development.
4. Administrative Reforms
Inadequate factual development in the existing case law is hardly
the only problem. The most serious difficulty is administrative. The
"clear articulation" and "active supervision" prongs of the state action
doctrine are designed to promote rapid and fairly easy disposition of
antitrust challenges to state and local government. Ideally, "articula-
tion" can be assessed by looking at a state's statutes, or perhaps legisla-
tive history, regulations, or occasionally case law. Generally these
things can be judicially noticed, making the authorization require-
ment an ideal candidate for motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6).
"Active supervision" can be a littde more difficult, but need not be.
Often the public records provide ample evidence of supervision or the
lack of such evidence. As a result, state action immunity questions are
often resolved on motions to dismiss.
In contrast, measurement of "spillovers" in the context of anti-
trust litigation would at best be an empirically challenging exercise.
First, every state and local regulation has some spillover. For example,
out-of-state visitors may have to use the trash disposal,90 taxicab, 91 hos-
pital,92 or ambulance services93 that are subject to a challenged re-
90. See, e.g., S. Disposal, Inc. v. Tex. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 161 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir.
1998); Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1987).
91. See Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Haw., Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 875
(9th Cir. 1987); Campbell v. City of Chi., 823 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1987); Indep. Taxicab
Drivers' Employees v. Greater Houston Transp. Co., 760 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1986); Santos v. City of Houston, 852 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994);
Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978). Most of these in-
volved exclusive licenses for things such as airport pickup, often from large international
airports such as Dallas-Ft. Worth (Woolen), Houston (Independent Taxicab Drivers), or
O'Hare (Campbell). None of the decisions mentioned interstate spillover effects.
92. Jackson, Tenn. Hosp. Co. v. W. Tenn. Healthcare, Inc., 414 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir.
2005); Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond v. Hosp. Serv. Dist., 171 F.3d 231 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 964 (1999); Martin v. Mem'l Hosp. at Guffport, 86 F.3d 1391 (5th Cir.
1996).
93. A-i Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. County of Monterey, 90 F.3d 333 (9th Cir. 1996);
Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kan. City, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985).
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straint. The resale price maintenance scheme at issue in Midcal almost
certainly affected out-of-state wine purchasers. 94 But unless we want to
jettison the state action exemption altogether, these spillovers must be
regarded as de minimis, or as not sufficiently substantial to invoke any
exception to the immunity.
Beyond that, we certainly cannot expect litigants to conduct a
cost-benefit analysis tailored after the Kaldor-Hicks model of eco-
nomic efficiency, asking whether the harmful impact on out-of-state
interests was larger than the benefits conferred on in-state residents.
Doing so would move the state action immunity from one of relatively
simple disposition on motions to dismiss or early summary judgment
into a litigation nightmare involving multiple experts and costly em-
pirical studies. It must be borne in mind that often these disputes are
relatively small in the world of antitrust cases, involving such things as
a single physician's challenge to the policies of a public hospital, or a
small trash removal firm's or taxicab operator's challenge to an exclu-
sive franchise. Further, public defendants such as municipalities lack
the resources for costly litigation.
To be sure, one can imagine egregious situations in which the
impact of state regulation falls almost entirely on out-of-state interests,
but then it seems the dormant Commerce Clause would be sufficient
to handle the problem. 95
It is largely for this reason that the ANTITRUST LAW treatise has
played down the spillover problem, even though I was one of the au-
thors cited in the Task Force Report as stating the spillover concern. 96
It is a concern, but the most fundamental piece of cost-benefit analysis
is an assessment of whether the benefits of taking extraterritorial spil-
lovers into account will justify the very considerable increase in costs
likely to affect most state action cases.
The authors of the Task Force Report appear to be aware of this,
although they did not explicitly articulate the concern. The Task
Force Report argues that "overwhelming" state spillovers be taken into
account in deciding the immunity question. 97 The limitation to over-
whelming is undoubtedly intended to address the fact finding prob-
lem, but even so, a broad factual inquiry will be required. The authors
then add in a footnote:
94. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
95. See cases cited supra notes 91-94.
96. See TASK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 78, at 43 n.186 (citing Hovenkamp & Macker-
ron, supra note 45).
97. Id. at 56.
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When the degree [sic] of spillover is more marginal, and difficult
to measure, prudence and a desire for legal rules with ex ante pre-
dictability counsel against giving significant weight to interstate
spillovers. But where the benefits of a given anticompetitive restric-
tion accrue overwhelmingly to residents of the state implementing
the restriction, and the harms fall overwhelmingly on residents of
other states, then the considerations behind both the Interstate
Commerce Clause and the federal antitrust laws are at their height,
and the case for judicial recognition of those spillovers is at its
strongest.9 8
Still, one wonders whether there will be restraints that meet this test
for antitrust purposes, but would not be excluded in any event by the
dormant Commerce Clause. 99
5. Need for Sensitivity to Substantive Antitrust Policy Issues
Finally, antitrust tribunals need to be somewhat more sensitive to
substantive issues of antitrust policy in deciding questions that impli-
cate the state action immunity. Too many cases have required lengthy
appellate litigation, sometimes even to the Supreme Court, when the
case could have been disposed of far more readily on antitrust
grounds. The FTC has somewhat ambiguously suggested a "tiered" ap-
proach to the state action immunity, with a clearer state articulation of
purpose to displace the antitrust laws required as the restraint be-
comes more anticompetitive.' 00 While one can appreciate the under-
lying concern, this approach overly complicates an already complex
doctrine. It would be far better to require that articulation be clear in
all cases, under a plain statement rule. When concerns for competi-
tion seem relatively modest, rather than watering down the articula-
98. Id. at 57 n.242.
99. One possibility is municipal restraints where the impact of the restraint falls
outside of the municipality but within the state. In that case, however, the issue is probably
best left to state law.
100. See Delacourt & Zywicki, supra note 38, at 1089-90 (referring to the TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 78, at 12). Delacourt & Zywicki suggest:
Pursuant to such a tiered approach, the level of clear articulation required would
increase or decrease, depending on the nature of the anticompetitive conduct at
issue. This approach reflects that fact that, the more serious the nature of the
anticompetitive conduct, the more likely it is to restrain trade. Thus, it is logical
to assume that the alleged beneficiary of a restraint will be more likely to engage
in more serious anticompetitive conduct as such conduct is also more likely to be
successful. Increasing the level of clear articulation required to match the serious-
ness of the alleged anticompetitive conduct should therefore create at least a
rough link between the defendant's incentives and a grant of state action protec-
tion, with the result that the "clear articulation" requirement will be most rigor-
ous where the defendant is most likely to engage in anticompetitive conduct.
Id. at 1089.
Spring 20061 AMC SYMPOSIUM
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
tion requirement, litigants and courts would do better to go straight
to the merits. The previously mentioned Boulder decision, which was
litigated all the way to the Supreme Court, provides a good example.
Uncertain about the best course for future development of its cable
television system, the City of Boulder enacted a moratorium on fur-
ther expansion of its incumbent cable television provider while it con-
sidered whether such expansion was preferable to new entry by other
providers. The complaint should have been dismissed on the plead-
ings. First, the City of Boulder was not a participant in the cable televi-
sion market at all. Second, the plaintiff was claiming an antitrust right
to expand its monopoly franchise rather than permitting the City to
inaugurate competition. 10 1
The state action immunity is essential in situations where state
regulation endorses collusion or similar practices that are almost cer-
tainly antitrust violations when committed in the private sector. It is
completely unnecessary when a state or local government regulates in
a way that never gives rise to an antitrust cause of action to begin with.
The tougher cases are a relatively small number in the middle, which
involve arguable rule of reason violations but also a colorable case for
state authorization and active supervision. With respect to these, I do
not believe that a more lenient test for immunity is the right ap-
proach; the state either declares an intention to displace the antitrust
laws or it does not. In most such cases, an examination of the antitrust
merits would be a much quicker road to resolution.
Conclusion
Federal antitrust policy has always been delimited by concerns for
federalism. While the role of the states in regulating their own econo-
mies is not as significant today as it was when the Sherman Act was
passed, that is no reason for jettisoning our federal system of eco-
nomic regulation, provided that preserving it is defensible on policy
grounds and not too costly. When a state regulates well, appropriately
limiting the range of private entrepreneurial discretion, then federal
antitrust must ordinarily stand aside, even though the federal decision
maker thinks that the state regulatory regime in question is poorly
designed or inefficient. However, concerns for federalism do not re-
101. The plaintiff also alleged a conspiracy between the City and the cable company
that wanted to enter the market to substitute the latter for the former. See 2 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, 348e (2d ed.). However, no competition is diminished when
one monopoly franchise is substituted for another one, and such plaintiffs ordinarily lack
standing. 2 Id.
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quire the federal antitrust tribunal simply to cave in to purely private
business discretion.
To that end, the McCarran-Ferguson insurance immunity is long
overdue for repeal. That statute does virtually no good and creates an
immunity whose social cost in the form of increased collusion is un-
doubtedly very high. By contrast, the Parker state action doctrine is
salvageable with much more modest fixes that leave its basic structural
requirements intact.
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